In 1949 a powerful political-military movement, led by the Chinese Communist party, gained control of war-ravaged China, inheriting a disorganized administration and a society eroded by decades of revolution. Within a short time China was so radically transformed politically, economically, and socially that it appeared to have cut all links with the past. The instruments of that transformation were ideology and organization. Today, seventeen years later, the i
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Until a short time ago, it appeared that much of what was going on in China could be characterised by the cynical aphorismplus ça change plus c'est la même chose. Many things became manifest in the country that were reminiscent of themes centuries old. China had gone through two radical phases, one during the First Five-Year Plan period when the Chinese Communists tried to repeat the Soviet experience of industrialisation, and the second during the Great Leap Forward when they used their own mobilisational means to try to achieve economic break-through. The ninth Plenum in January 1961 called a dramatic halt to the extreme policies of the Great Leap Forward, and launched a period that bears strong similarities to the N.E.P. (New Economic Policy) period of the early 1920s in the Soviet Union. Many traditional patterns that were effaced during the years of radicalism began to reappear. There was talk of the need "to study very well traditional economic relationships." It seemed that for a while the leadership had decided that only a truly voluntary response from below, and not coercion of any sort, could rescue China from the morass in which it found itself. But as of the time of the writing of this article, there are ominous signs that China may be approaching another "1928." The Party drums are rolling once again, and the themes are not those of the N.E.P., but more like those which preceded the great Soviet collectivisation drive of 1928. During the last few years, the leadership made no attempt to hide the facts of China's poverty and isolation. But now a new note of defiance, of toughness has crept out. Where it will lead is hard to say.
Developmental strategy in Communist China is a complex of ideological, political, economic, and social vari ables. During the fourteen years of the Chinese People's Re public, the leadership has applied two distinct developmental strategies, one for each of the two five-year plan periods. The first strategy, adapted from the Soviet model, aimed at select development of a modern sector with savings largely generated by the remainder of the economy. The political means chosen were centralized planning and direction with strong emphasis on administrative authority. Hardly were the preconditions for carrying out the first strategy present when the leadership began to modify the system, moving gradually toward a new strategy which achieved full form during the Great Leap For ward. This, in many significant respects, reversed earlier poli cies. Simultaneous development of the entire economy was stressed. Politically, it involved a far-reaching decentraliza tion of authority, with newly created regional and local power wielded by party committees. Socially, it stressed the func tions of the party and the working masses, correspondingly squeezing administrators, technicians, and "intellectuals." Over-all disorganization led early in 1961 to radical modifica tion of Great Leap Forward policy toward national economic "balance." There has been a return to rational bureaucratic modes of operation, but much economic decentralization ef fected late in 1957 remains. Though the economy appears again to be moving, there are indications of political indecision. No new further strategy of development has been announced.
